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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Europe Division
Chief, Eastern Europe Division
Chief, Southeast Europe Division
Chief, Soviet Russia Division
Chief, Near East and Africe Division
Chief, Far East Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Planning and Program Coordination Staff
Director of Training

SUBJECT: Guidance on Evasion and Escape Concepts

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to offer guidance for the establishment of clandestine E&E facilities during the cold war for use during hot war or cold war contingencies. It is intended that this information be utilized by Agency headquarters elements in planning, preparation and support for operational activities in the E&E field. The PP Staff is preparing a book dispatch for dissemination to the field of the information contained herein.

2. AGENCY DEVELOPMENT OF E&E CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES

A. GENERAL

DEFINITION: Evasion and Escape, according to the Defense-CIA Delineation of Responsibilities for E&E, is "that field of unconventional warfare action in support of military tactics and strategy which involves the procedures and operations whereby U.S. and Allied military personnel and other selected individuals' are able to emerge from an enemy-held or unfriendly area to areas under Allied control. Recovery and rescue operations from other than enemy-held areas are not considered to be included in this definition."

In addition, the Agency has a unilateral requirement for a cold war capability for extricating and exfiltrating specific individuals from local control in certain areas. The personnel may be U.S. citizens or foreign individuals in which the U.S. has interest; the area involved may be specifically hostile, or one in which the current political climate is inimical to the best interests of the U.S.

SECRET

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SECRET

(1) It is recognized, therefore, that the Evasion and Escape field includes Agency and Military cold and hot war requirements. The need for a practical approach to the diverse problems in this field has become increasingly clear with the extensive cold war commitments of the U.S. In the event of general or limited warfare, or a contingency situation, U.S. citizens, military, or civilian, may be subject to enemy capture or forced to undertake evasion through hostile areas. The partial or full commitment of U.S. air or ground forces in such a situation would further increase the potential value of already developed E&E facilities. Therefore, Agency planning and development of E&E facilities has been moving toward the establishment of those mechanisms or capabilities which have utility in all types of war or contingency situations, in direct support of U.S. policy.

(2) Agency and Military coordination and Planning have been slow inasmuch as military data on overflight routes, air-strike targets, potential radiation fallout, and requirements for air support, logistics lift and personnel infiltration-exfiltration have been either changing or indefinite. It may be said, however, that conditions which have limited the exchange of such necessary information are being alleviated, and the future promises certain progress.

B. COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF E&E FACILITIES

(1) E&E NUCLEI

Experience has indicated that the most practical approach to meeting the Agency's responsibilities in cold war development of E&E assets for hot war or emergency utilization lies in creation of clandestine E&E nuclei. These nuclei should consist of one or a few indigenous agents, well-trained in E&E concepts and techniques, who are "in place" and have a good potential for "stayability" in their area. Such nuclei should be specifically trained in spotting and assessing of additional personnel to be utilized during a hot war to supplement the E&E facility. In addition, E&E nuclei should have the potential for operational use of the nuclei themselves if such expansion is impossible. In this regard it is recognized that in many parts of the world it may be possible to develop and utilize only the nuclei themselves.

The development of cold war E&E nuclei also appears to meet general operational problems with certain

SECRET

advantages over development of the complete or "classic" clandestine E&E nets.

a. Security problems in creation and maintenance of nuclei are less than in those of a larger organization inasmuch as fewer personnel are involved and closer control should be possible.

b. Development and maintenance of operational techniques are more practically accomplished with a nucleus for the same reasons. Motivation can be more readily maintained.

c. Nuclei may be operationally employed during cold war periods in secondary tasks, such as intelligence reporting, with relatively good security.

It is therefore recommended that in every area where E&E requirements exist or may be anticipated, i.e. where enemy over-run or hostile seizure of an area is probable as event of war or local contingency, efforts be continued or be initiated in developing these basic E&E nuclei elements.

(2) COLD WAR OPERATIONS IN E&E

The Agency has undertaken development of doctrine and techniques for the cold war role in support of U.S. national policy through extrication of selected individuals from certain areas. This phase of the E&E field has received impetus because of the many coups and revolutions which have taken place during the past two years, and due to which personnel in whom the U.S. has an interest have been imprisoned or are detained under undesirable local control.

(3) HOT WAR E&E CONCEPTS

Among the major considerations which confront the Agency in planning and development of E&E is determination as to the type of indigenous facility which is most applicable for wartime use in the various areas likely to be involved.

(1) It has been generally recognized that the complete, or classic, clandestine E&E net is the most useful, if it is possible to create and maintain such an organization. However, the number of assets necessary

SECRET

to operate a mechanism of this nature, and the attendant time, financial and security problems, offer a potential for varied and serious difficulties in the development and implementation of the classic net. In the optimum, the classic net includes elements for:

- a. Contact, holding, and identification of the evader or contact;
- b. Capability for Movement of the evader;
- c. Facilities for ultimate evacuation or recovery of the evader;
- d. Communications;

Nets of the classic type have been developed successfully under wartime conditions in areas where, generally, there is reasonably heavy population density, where well-developed transport and communications facilities exist, and where a significant percentage of the population in the enemy-occupied country is, or has been, pro-west in their attitude or political orientation. In this regard, success has been achieved in the establishment of such classic facilities during the cold war period in such areas as described above.

(2) The second E&E concept for wartime application is that which utilized the limited E&E facility. This is, in fact, the implementation of the E&E nucleus which was developed during the cold war period and which could not be expanded to the complete net due to local security obstacles or other reasons. The limited E&E facility is applicable in many parts of the world where population centers are more widely scattered, where socio-economic factors are, perhaps, less developed or where only a minor percentage of the population of the hostile area may have been considered pro-west in their attitudes. Limited E&E facilities may be operated with one or a few persons and are, of course, usually restricted in potential or capability. The limited facility may exist as one or more segments of the classic net; for example, it may consist only of a contact-holding facility; have a partial or complete capability for movement of evaders; or, perhaps, have a recovery or evacuation potential. In other cases the limited facility may offer only assistance in border-crossing or air or sea reception-evacuation. In order to assure optimum security for the indigenous element in such limited E&E facilities a basic capability should exist for holding and identifying an evader prior to his

SECRET

being offered the limited capabilities in movement or evacuation which may exist.

(3) A third concept in hot war E&E is the extension of the cold war capability for infiltration-exfiltration operations for the purpose of gaining access and offering assistance to U.S. or Allied POWs, or other selected persons, to effect their escape from hostile detention.

(4) One aspect of the E&E field deserving of particular attention is that of the supplementary E&E mechanism. Undoubtedly some E&E facilities will be developed in conjunction with, be incorporated into, or supplementary to, larger resistance elements, guerrilla forces or the like. In such cases the E&E facilities will not exist as an individual mechanism but will be subject to the primary objectives of the larger organization. E&E elements so affiliated may find it necessary to undertake special responsibilities or actions, receiving in turn, the protection and full assistance of the larger organization. For example, it may be necessary for such E&E elements to hold evaders for protracted periods of time prior to making efforts for the evader's evacuation. There is also the probability that evaders being held under such circumstances will be required to involve themselves actively in the pursuits of the resistance group rather than passively accepting the "hospitality" and holding facilities of this group. It may be necessary also to effect the movement of the evader to refuge or evacuation points which are far removed from the areas of operation of the resistance group so as to afford as much security as possible for this latter element as well as for the supplementary E&E mechanism.

3. The difficulties of establishing stay-behind elements of the nature set forth herein are fully realized. However, inasmuch as the Agency is officially committed to the operational development and implementation of such staybehind facilities it is desired that appropriate priority be given thereto. In this regard, it is strongly recommended that careful consideration be given to the possible supplementary cold-war use of which such facilities may be put in current intelligence reporting, area assessment for wartime use of landing zones, drop zones, infiltration/exfiltration areas, etc., in order to further justify maintenance of such long range assets.

4. The Defense- CIA Agreement on the Delineation of Responsibilities for the field of E&E, previously mentioned in Para 2A above, has been in effect since August, 1957. This document is presently under revision and when final agreement thereon is reached the addressees of this memorandum will be advised of the results.

SECRET

5. The PP Staff (PP/PMD) will be available to offer any further assistance or guidance on the foregoing matters, in general or in specific, as the need may be.

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